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i. THiS YeAR, iT’S ALL ABoUT THe MoneY
A. Did We Mention There’s not enough Money? The emerging issue in government contracting, 
looking ahead, is the money (or lack of it). As the fiscal belt tightens, the procurement landscape—what 
the government buys, from whom, and how—will necessarily change. The Obama administration has 
made clear that no stone will remain unturned in the effort to achieve savings. Everything, appar-
ently, is on the table…. except, of course, for the muffins! DOJ Conference Muffins Come Under Heat 
From IG, 53 GC ¶ 311 (The DOJ inspector general reported that DOJ “did not always minimize costs 
for event planning and food and beverages at conferences[.]” Moreover, “conferences featured costly 
meals, refreshments [e.g., $16 for muffins and $8 for cups of coffee], and themed breaks … indicative 
of wasteful or extravagant spending[.]”) Developments In Brief: Those Muffins Did Not Cost $16, After 
All, 53 GC ¶ 369(b) (DOJ IG issued a revised report superseding its earlier report and “determined 
that [its] initial conclusions concerning the itemized costs of refreshments at the … conference were 
incorrect and that the Department did not pay $16 per muffin.”)
Given the budget uncertainties, the potential for short-term disruption is enormous. Elizabeth 
A. Ferrell, Feature Comment: Implications Of Funding Shortfalls And Budget Cuts For Government 
Contractors, 53 GC ¶ 167 (discussing continuing resolutions, de-scoping, stretch-outs, production 
breaks, terminations, (the enormous risks associated with) self-funding, and, of course, Nunn-McCurdy 
Implications). Ferrell paints a stark picture and offers frank advice:
The fiscal crisis will drive agencies to take drastic action to reduce procurement spending. 
Contractors need to prepare for the inevitable. … [C]ontractors should assess programmatic 
vulnerabilities caused by changes in threats, roles and missions; changes in technology; changes 
in priorities; and cost and schedule growth.… [They] should understand the Government’s 
most current assessment of a program’s technology, design and production maturity, and other 
programmatic issues. … [They] should reexamine their portfolios, determine what makes long-
term strategic sense, and develop a procurement advocacy plan…. [They] should assess their 
contractual vulnerabilities, including performance status…. [C]ontractors should prepare for a 
possible termination…. [M]ost importantly, contractors should regularly track contract funding 
status and identify potential limitation of costs/funds issues, since contractors that incur costs 
in excess of funding are at risk that those costs will never be reimbursed by the Government.
B. is the Government Serious About Saving Money? One of the fascinating things about the 
government-contractor relationship is that neither the customer nor the vendor control all of the sig-
nificant cost drivers. In a terrific example of this, the Postal Service Inspector General (IG) published 
a report stating the (blatantly) obvious proposition that, in order to achieve savings: “[t]he Postal 
Service should seek an exemption from the Service Contract Act [SCA] to negotiate contract rates 
closer to market rates[.]” SCA Exemption, Outsourcing Could Cut Postal Service Costs, 53 GC ¶ 375. 
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Among other things, the IG “identified six contract labor categories with 
higher SCA rates than market rates. … SCA rates for snow removal and 
landscaping were 34 percent higher than market rates, cleaning/janitorial 
rates were 33 percent higher, and unarmed guard rates were 31 percent 
higher.” But equally fascinating was the fact that:
[I]n-house Postal Service labor rates significantly exceeded SCA 
rates. The Postal Service’s cleaning/janitorial rate of $44.51 per 
hour was 283 percent higher than the SCA rate of $15.74, and 
the Postal Service rate for postal-vehicle service drivers was 
$47.89, or 180 percent higher than the $26.63 SCA rate. 
Of course, these types of savings could make a real difference. “The Postal 
Service’s financial outlook is poor and labor costs account for 80 percent of 
its costs[.]” In addition, the IG acknowledged some of the related barriers 
to outsourcing (both at the Postal Service and across the Government), 
including “current labor union agreements, concerns that new unions will 
be formed, workforce retention issues, fluctuations in market or economic 
conditions, and the potential for congressional constituency concerns.” But 
don’t hold your breath on major changes in this area.
A model based on strong Congressional leadership and bipartisan 
cooperation could facilitate the government’s efforts to manage its fis-
cal, as well as any contracting, woes. See, e.g., Senators Call On Super 
Committee To Lower Government Contracting Costs, 53 GC ¶ 350 (Sena-
tors “support the administration’s efforts to reduce wasteful spending 
in Government contracting, including the use of strategic sourcing to 
leverage the Government’s buying power and the termination of failing 
[IT] contracts. They also endorse the call for agencies to stop using cost-
reimbursement and non-competitive contracts. Although it is difficult to 
determine cost savings from these initiatives, as well as the push to ensure 
inherently governmental jobs are not filled by contractors, the senators 
said that the impact on the budget will be positive.” (Emphasis added.) 
These “recommendations also include capping reimbursement of federal 
contractor executives.”) Unfortunately, no such model exists. Bingham C. 
Jamison, The Super Committee: Failure at Any Cost, tIme (December 20, 
2011), available at http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2011/12/20/the-super-
committee-failure-at-any-cost/ (“It comes as no surprise that the bicameral 
and bipartisan super committee — that 12-person debt panel charged with 
finding $1.2 trillion in deficit savings over the next 10 years — failed in 
its mandate. … One look at the members of the super committee sheds 
light on some troubling trends in Congress writ large, and perhaps partly 
explains its failure.”).
The new facts of life are that the government will spend less money 
for the foreseeable future—we don’t yet know how much. In addition, the 
government’s spending priorities will change. We don’t yet know which 
programs will be cancelled, or which resources will be reallocated, but 
change is in the air. Yes, there have been—and there will continue to be—
significant changes in leadership. New and different issues will continue 
to challenge acquisition professionals. But the big story looking ahead in 
2012 and beyond anticipates seismic changes, and potential course cor-
rections, after a decade-long growth trend finally reverses itself.
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ii. oPen LeADeRSHiP iSSUeS
With the close of 2011, we applaud the service of Daniel Gordon as the 
Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP). OFPP 
churned out a fair amount of work product before Administrator Gordon’s 
exit. As the White House explained:
On Dan’s watch, spending on federal contracting decreased for 
the first time in more than a dozen years…. Dan has worked 
with the [GSA], buying agencies, and industry, to reform the 
way the government buys commodities … so that we are—
finally—leveraging the federal government’s purchasing 
power as the world’s largest customer…. Dan has also helped 
unleash the talent and ingenuity of the federal workforce, so 
that innovative buying methods, such as electronic reverse 
auctions, are encouraged and adopted. … Dan has demonstrated 
a commitment to listening to the concerns of all stakeholders, 
launching a ‘Myth-Busters’ campaign to promote more open 
communication between the government and industry …, and 
developing a pathbreaking policy letter that clarifies the line 
between work that can be contracted out and work that is 
inherently governmental. … Dan has helped … strengthen… the 
… acquisition workforce…, the Administration’s commitment 
to tightening oversight of contractors, …, [and] the contract 
management role of [CORs]….
Jack Lew, News from OFPP, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2011/11/02/news-ofpp; Gordon to Leave OFPP, 53 GC ¶ 369(d). As 
we approach 2012, we are curious to see what the administration has in 
store—not only in terms of leadership, but in terms of policy in an election 
year. As of December, the media had reported that Joseph Jordan, then-
serving as the SBA’s associate administrator of government contracting 
and business development, would assume a senior advisory role in OMB. 
The media (promptly and consistently) speculated that the administration 
could nominate Jordon to replace Dan Gordon as the OFPP administrator.
iii. TRenDS: FinALLY, THe enD oF THe PoST-MiLLeniUM 
PRoCUReMenT SPenDinG BinGe
A. A new economic Reality? This chapter’s coverage of the fed-
eral procurement spending trend has steadily increased. This year is no 
different, but we also look further back to put the trend in context (and 
attempt to predict—or guess what lies ahead in—the future). It’s easy to 
forget that, while federal procurement spending was always significant, it 
wasn’t always this significant. Just consider: In Fiscal Year 2001, federal 
procurement spending rose to just over $223 billion. The following years, 
in 2002 and 2003, we witnessed 18 and 20 percent spending increases. 
Entering 2012, we just completed the fourth consecutive fiscal year in 
which federal procurement spending exceeded $535 billion.
It’s no secret how we got here (but, again, we’re here). Using adjusted 
figures (yes, between the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) and 
USASpending.gov, history is consistently being re-written), it appears 
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that the annual increases in federal procurement—from 2001 through 
2008—were never less than three times the rate of inflation. The experts 
correctly predicted that the growth rate eventually would taper; in 2009, 
the rate slowed and, apparently, growth finally stalled. Yet, in retrospect, 
the dire warnings that the current spending binge was a blip—and that 
procurement spending would promptly retract—were unfounded. 
 Now there seems to be greater consensus and empirical evidence that 
the procurement spending growth cycle finally has run its course. But the 
news is not all bad for contractors in that—at least for now—the plateau 
represents the high-end of a robust and sustained growth curve. 
Federal Procurement Spending 2001-2011*
Fiscal 
Year
Procurement Spending 
(in Billions of Dollars)
Percentage Increase 
or (Decrease) From 
Previous Year
Percentage Increase or 
(Decrease) in Consumer 
Price Index (CPI)
2011 $535.1* (~1) 3.4*
2010 $537.7 ($534.5)† (~1) 0.1
2009 $541.3 ($540.4) (~0) (0.4)
2008 $541.8 ($541.3) 13.9 3.8
2007 $475.3 ($475.0) 10.5 2.8
2006 $432.0 ($429.8) 9.8 3.2
2005 $391.2 13.1 3.4
2004 $346.4 ($345.8) 8.8 2.7
2003 $318.3 ($317.7) 20.6 2.3
2002 $263.4 18.0 1.6
2001 $223.1
*FY 2011 figures reflect preliminary reporting.
† Dollar figures in parenthesis reflect last year’s reported numbers. Other parentheticals reflect 
negative numbers.
See www.USASpending.gov. Annual increases in the Consumer Price 
Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) were extracted from the annual 
Detailed Report Tables, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid1111.pdf. 
B. Big Business, Major Players. Looking behind the data, the con-
centration of spending amongst the largest contracting agencies and gov-
ernment contractors remains significant. For example, for fiscal year 2011:
• The Defense Department accounted for 70 percent of the total 
procurement dollars awarded. (That’s quite high, up again, 
ever-so-slightly from the (seemingly high) 69 percent last year.)
• The seven largest procuring agencies (DoD, Energy, HHS, GSA, 
NASA, VA, and DHS) accounted for just under 90 percent of 
the total dollars awarded.
• The 100 largest federal contractors received more than $284 
billion in contracts (down from $294 billion in FY 2010) or more 
than half (almost 54 percent) of the total dollars awarded.
• Conversely, the 571,437 contract actions (an increase of ap-
proximately ten percent over FY 2010) these 100 firms, as a 
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group, received accounted for slightly more than ten percent 
of the total actions.
• The top five federal contractors (Lockheed Martin, Boeing, 
Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, and Raytheon—the 
same top five as FY 2010) received more than $102 billion 
(down approximately ten percent as compared to FY 2010) 
in contracts or more than nineteen percent (down from over 
twenty-one percent in FY 2010) of the total dollars awarded.
• Thirty-four firms received contract awards of more than $2 
billion (exactly the same number as FY 2010).
• Seventy-one contractors (two more than in FY 2010) were 
awarded, individually, more than $1 billion in contracts.
C. Defense (and Homeland Security): Slicing and Dicing the 
Data. For some time, we have become comfortable with the Defense De-
partment accounting for approximately two-thirds of federal procurement 
spending. Expectations that an insatiable, ever-morphing Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) might chip away at DoD’s share never tran-
sitioned to reality. And, not surprisingly, with sustained military actions 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, that share inched upward. This year, however, 
we gained additional insights into the modern-era DoD spending trend 
line. See, generally, the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, Center for 
Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) report, Gregory Sanders, et 
al., U.S. Department of Defense Contract Spending and the Supporting 
Industrial Base (May 6, 2011), available at http://csis.org/publication/
defense-contract-trends-0. The report tracks DoD Contract spending over 
the twenty-year period, 1990-2010. Some of the trends are familiar, oth-
ers less obvious.
• Procurement of Services grew at a much faster pace than 
products (supplies) or research and development (R&D).
• There was a clear shift in priorities following the end of the 
Cold War. Drawing down military and civilian personnel 
after the Cold War necessitated an increase in outsourc-
ing to continue providing many services, while spending on 
products decreased with the numbers of active-duty military.
• Contract spending on R&D fell relative to other categories 
of spending throughout the late 1990s and the 2000’s. Yet 
R&D continued to shrink as a percentage of total defense 
contract dollars even as the defense budget increased after 
2002. Given that the ratio of investment in R&D to the rest 
of defense contract spending has been lower over the past 
20 years than in previous decades, the benefits that will be 
reaped from a drawdown in the coming years may be fewer.
• The Army’s share of the DoD procurement pie expanded, while 
the Navy and Air Force shares declined.
• Army contract spending skyrocketed after 2000. During 
the 1990s, the Army accounted for 23-25 percent of total 
DoD contract spending. This share grew rapidly from 2002 
through 2008, reaching 40 percent of total DoD contract 
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spending by 2008. Army contract spending increased by an 
average of more than 11.5 percent per year since 1999. 
• Despite increased spending by the Marine Corps, navy 
contract spending followed an opposite trend to that of the 
Army.
• In an unprecedented development (in the modern era), Air 
Force spending declined to the lowest of all DoD components.
• The top five defense contractors retained their position 
from 1999 to 2009. Outside of this small group, however, little 
evidence suggests that the defense industry is consolidating 
into an oligopoly dominated by a small number of incumbent 
firms. Specifically, there were dynamic changes in the composi-
tion of the top 20 contractors in the industry over the last 20 
years. 
• While small business appears to have increased its share 
of the pie, medium-sized contractors appear to have lost 
market share to both large and small contractors. 
• At a macro level, DoD awarded the majority of its contract dol-
lars on an increasingly competitive basis towards the end of 
the period studied.
• The share of contract dollars awarded using fixed price con-
tracts grew at a faster rate than cost-based contract awards.
• As we noted last year, through 2009, there was a disturbing 
and sudden rise in “combination” contracts, which obfus-
cated the total distribution of cost and price-based contracts. 
Contract spending allocated to this category seems to have 
mostly disappeared in 2010.
• Spending on indefinite delivery vehicles rose sharply in the 
last few years, while definitive contracts and purchase orders 
stagnated, then declined in 2010.
• In a separate report, CSIS produced a similar, but more modest 
data set for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
tracking trends for 2004-2010 (with the disclaimer that 2002-
2003 mainly reflected DHS start-up costs). Defense-Industrial 
Initiatives Group, Center for Strategic & International Stud-
ies, DHS Contract Spending and the Supporting Industrial 
Base (July 21, 2011), available at http://csis.org/publication/
dhs-contract-spending-and-supporting-industrial-base. CSIS 
found that DHS’s contract spending was relatively stable, with 
the most fluctuation in FEMA following major disasters. Not 
surprisingly, most growth in DHS procurement occurred in 
services, with slower growth in products and decreases in R&D.
D. Grants: Follow The Money. For now, it remains little known that, 
despite all of the attention focused upon government contracting, grant 
spending outpaced procurement spending by more than fifteen percent 
over the last decade. While FY 2011 may have been a virtual tie, grant 
spending exceeded procurement spending for nine of the last eleven years. 
We have not yet analyzed the extraordinary (12 percent) short-term dip 
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in grant spending in 2007 and 2008, but that pales in comparison to the 
(post-crash, stimulus package-infused) 58 percent increase in grant 
spending in 2009. We will not be surprised to learn, down the road, that 
the wild fluctuations in grant spending derive, in part, from inaccurate 
reporting (more on this below); for now these are the best numbers avail-
able. As a taxpayer, one might hope or expect that, eventually, the oversight 
and regulatory community shifts its focus from procurement to grants. If 
the government is serious about reducing its debts and its annual deficits, 
this seems unavoidable. 
Federal Procurement and Grant Spending 2001-2011*
Fiscal Year Procurement Spending (in Billions) Grant Spending (in Billions)
2011 $535.1* $545.2*
2010 $537.7 $612.7
2009 $541.3 $664.8
2008 $541.8 $418.8
2007 $475.3 $429.9
2006 $432.0 $490.0
2005 $391.2 $441.6
2004 $346.4 $450.1
2003 $318.3 $493.7
2002 $263.4 $406.3
2001 $223.1 $330.8
*FY 2011 reflects preliminary reporting.
Total Federal Spending, www.USASpending.gov.
e. Data Quality: As we’ve noted in the past, the procurement spend-
ing data available to the public continues to improve, but plenty of room 
for improvement remains. We were encouraged that, on USASpending.
gov, the retrospective adjustments to the previously published spending 
data changed far less this year than last. (Re-writing history, when it im-
proves accuracy, is not a bad thing.) Also, if you are a visual learner (or if 
you like colorful, moving pictures, cartoons, etc.), you will enjoy the Graph 
View option for displaying trends related to, among others, “Prime Award 
Spend Data” from 2000 to the present. We particularly recommend the 
bubble view (as opposed to the more sedate bar and line graph options). We 
encourage you to experiment with the various options which permit you 
to manipulate the graphs according to time, type of transaction, amount 
of transaction, place of performance, etc. 
iV. THe onGoinG DeBATe: oUTSoURCinG-inSoURCinG
Last year, we discussed the swinging pendulum that reflects the 
outsourcing-insourcing trend of the moment, and that discussion con-
tinues. PSC Opposes ‘Insourcing’ Language In Appropriations Bill, 53 
GC ¶ 407 (PSC opposes “arbitrary, anti-business language” that would 
force the Government to “arbitrarily insource work currently performed 
through partnerships between the public and private sectors even 
though current law and … guidance deem this work perfectly suitable 
for private sector performance based on agency determinations.”); Obama 
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Administration Opposes Restriction On Contracting Out Closely Associ-
ated Functions, 53 GC ¶ 387 (administration opposes [appropriations] 
language … that would require civilian agencies to ensure that services 
contracts “exclude to the maximum extent practicable functions that 
are closely associated with inherently governmental functions”); OFPP 
Issues Guidance On Inherently Governmental Functions, 53 GC ¶ 303; 
OMB, OFPP Policy Letter 11–01, Performance of Inherently Governmental 
and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 56227 (Sept. 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-09-12/pdf/2011-23165.pdf; House 
Republicans Seek Public-Private Competitions, 53 GC ¶ 240 (“Twenty-one 
House Republicans recently called for greater use of [OMB] Circular A-76 
public-private competitions”); OFPP’s Inherently Governmental Defini-
tion Poses Questions, CRS Finds, 53 GC ¶ 17 (“[T]hree key concerns for 
Congress are: (1) the relationship between the proposed policy letter and 
other executive branch authorities, (2) whether the proposed policy letter 
would necessarily result in changes in agencies’ use of contractors for 
particular functions[,] and (3) the potential demands on the acquisition 
workforce. Especially relevant to Government contractors is whether the 
proposed policy letter’s potential treatment of specific functions, such 
as the provision of security by contractors, would result in changes to 
agencies’ contractor use.”)
The battleground appears to increasingly focus on cost comparison 
between federal and contractor performance of services. It is premature 
to tell whether this is a meaningful debate or a side show. As we have dis-
cussed previously, the lion’s share of the government’s modern-era reliance 
on service contractors by-passed any meaningful cost comparison. Rather, 
most of the increase derived from an explosion of demand for government 
services without a corresponding increase (and, periodically, decreases) 
in the federal workforce (and military). Steven L. Schooner & Daniel S. 
Greenspahn, Too Dependent on Contractors? Minimum Standards for 
Responsible Governance, 6 J. Cont. mGmt. 9 (Summer 2008); Steven L. 
Schooner, Competitive Sourcing Policy: More Sail Than Rudder, 33 PuB. 
Cont. L. J. 263 (2004). Of course, that does not make the cost-comparison 
debate any less interesting.
The critical document in this context is the OSD Directive-Type 
Memorandum (DTM) 09-007, Estimating and Comparing the Full Costs 
of Civilian and Military Manpower and Contract Support, (January 29, 
2010; changed September 2, 2011) (“It is DoD policy that Defense officials 
are aware of the full costs of manpower and have a thorough understand-
ing of the implications of those costs to [DoD] and, on a broader scale, 
to the Federal Government when developing national security policies 
and making program commitments. ”), available at http://www.dtic.mil/
whs/directives/corres/pdf/DTM-09-007.pdf. But see, generally, Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 
DoD Workforce Cost Realism Assessment (May 2011), available at http://
csis.org/files/publication/110517_Berteau_DoDWorkforceCost_Web.pdf. 
“[T]he procedures laid out in the DTM for calculating the government’s 
costs for performing a service have several significant gaps [which] raise 
questions about the validity of any analysis generated on the basis of the 
DTM guidance.” The DTM, among other things:
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• Lacks the ability to calculate fully burdened government wide 
costs;
• Fails to account for the full cost of DoD-owned capital but in-
cludes those costs for contractors;
• Fails to account for taxes forgone by the U.S. Treasury or state 
or local governments;
• Fails to account for the inherent risk of cost growth among 
public producers;
• Overlooks the cumulative effect of multiple insourcing deci-
sions;
• Overlooks the imputed costs of insuring and indemnifying in-
house producers;
• Fails to account for non-cost factors, such as varying workload 
stability; and
• Fails to utilize a detailed standard of work as a basis for cost 
estimation.
CSIS’s “objective for creating [a separate] Cost Estimation Methodology is 
to account for the fully burdened costs to government [which] will create 
a level playing field between the public and the private sector, remov[e] 
any inherent competitive advantage for both sides, and enable[e] DoD to 
harness the cost saving power of competition.”
V. inFoRMATion TeCHnoLoGY: A neW APPRoACH?
Late in 2010, both OMB and the Defense Department published 
significant policy documents suggesting dramatic changes to the govern-
ment’s approach to purchasing and managing information technology 
hardware and services. OMB, DOD Chart New IT Paths, 53 GC ¶ 2; OMB 
Roadmap Improving IT Management, But More Should Be Done, Wit-
nesses Say, 53 GC ¶ 127 (“Dashboard data were not always accurate and 
were not consistent with agency cost and schedule performance data.”). 
Not surprisingly, 2011 saw the government produce a significant body of 
literature in this arena.
A. The Role of the Cio. 
• OMB Memo M-11-29, Chief Information Officer Authorities (August 
8, 2011). Of course, the memo reinforces the message that “[t]oo many 
Federal IT projects have run over budget, fallen behind schedule, or failed 
to deliver promised functionality, hampering agency missions and wast-
ing taxpayer dollars.” Accordingly, the government “is changing the role 
of Agency Chief Information Officers (CIOs) away from just policymaking 
and infrastructure maintenance, to encompass true portfolio management 
for all IT.” The memo emphasizes four main areas in which CIO’s should 
have a “lead role:” Governance, Commodity IT (“eliminating duplication 
and rationaliz[ing] their agency’s IT investments”); Program Management; 
and Information Security.
• GAO, Federal Chief Information Officers: Opportunities Exist to 
Improve Role in Information Technology Management, GAO-11-634 (Sep-
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tember 2011) (“[A]gency CIOs currently are not consistently responsible for 
all of the 13 areas assigned by statute or identified as critical to effective 
IT management. While the majority of CIOs are primarily responsible for 
key IT management areas, they are less likely to have primary responsi-
bility for information management duties.”)
B. Cloud Computing.
• Vivek Kundra, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Federal 
Cloud Computing Strategy (February 8, 2011) (“Cloud computing offers 
the government an opportunity to be more efficient, agile, and innovative 
through more effective use of IT investments, and by applying innovations 
developed in the private sector.”) This Strategy is designed to:
• Articulate the benefits, considerations, and trade-offs of cloud 
computing;
• Provide a decision framework and case examples to support 
agencies in migrating towards cloud computing;
• Highlight cloud computing implementation resources; and
• Identify Federal Government activities and roles and respon-
sibilities for catalyzing cloud adoption. 
“Each agency will re-evaluate its technology sourcing strategy to include 
consideration and application of cloud computing solutions as part of 
the budget process. Consistent with the Cloud First policy, agencies will 
modify their IT portfolios to fully take advantage of the benefits of cloud 
computing in order to maximize capacity utilization, improve IT flexibility 
and responsiveness, and minimize cost.”
• GSA has taken aggressive steps towards becoming the govern-
ment’s provider of cloud-related needs. “(GSA) Cloud Information Technol-
ogy (IT) Services help federal agencies identify and acquire the right cloud 
computing solution to meet their IT needs. GSA’s Cloud IT Services provide 
convenient, on-demand access to a shared pool of computing resources 
that can be rapidly and easily configured, provisioned, and released. These 
solutions are delivered through the Internet on a pay-per-use or subscrip-
tion basis in three service models: Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)..., 
Platform as a Service (PaaS)..., [and] Software as a Service (SaaS)[.]” See 
GSA’s Cloud Computing Brochure (and other resources), available at Cloud 
IT Services, http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/190333. 
• See also, National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Special Publication 500-293 (Draft), US Gov-
ernment Cloud Computing Technology Roadmap (Volumes I and II) (No-
vember 2011); National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
DRAFT Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations (May 2011); 
GAO, Information Security: Additional Guidance Needed to Address Cloud 
Computing Concerns, GAO-12-130T, October 6, 2011.
C. Cybersecurity and Related issues. 
See, generally, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace 
(July 2011), setting forth Five Strategic Initiatives:
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• Treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize, train, 
and equip so that DoD can take full advantage of cyberspace’s 
potential;
• Employ new defense operating concepts to protect DoD net-
works and systems;
• Partner with other U.S. government departments and agen-
cies and the private sector to enable a whole-of-government 
cybersecurity Strategy;
• Build robust relationships with U.S. allies and international 
partners to strengthen collective cybersecurity; and
• Leverage the nation’s ingenuity through an exceptional cyber 
workforce and rapid technological innovation.
See also, GAO, Cybersecurity: Continued Attention Needed to Protect Our 
Nation’s Critical Infrastructure, GAO-11-865T, July 26, 2011; GAO, Cy-
bersecurity: Continued Attention Needed to Protect Our Nation’s Critical 
Infrastructure and Federal Information Systems, GAO-11-463T, March 
16, 2011 (“Once again, we identified protecting the federal government’s 
information systems and the nation’s cyber critical infrastructure as a 
governmentwide high-risk area. We have designated federal information 
security as a high-risk area since 1997; in 2003, we expanded this high-
risk area to include protecting systems supporting our nation’s critical 
infrastructure, referred to as cyber critical infrastructure protection or 
cyber CIP.”). Cyber Pilot May Expand To More Contractor Networks, DOD 
Says, 53 GC ¶ 276 (Through its Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber 
Pilot program, DoD shares “classified threat intelligence … with defense 
contractors or their commercial internet service providers along with the 
know-how to employ it in network defense[.]”); Developments In Brief: 
Cyber Pilot to Help DOD, Industry Face Threats, Deputy Secretary Says, 
53 GC ¶ 216(b).
Vi. A neW eRA AT DoD: oF ReDUCTionS, PRioRiTieS, AnD 
THe DoD eFFiCienCY AnD PRoDUCTiViTY inTiATiVe
From a policy perspective, 2011 was less eventful than 2010, at least 
in terms of the Defense Department’s initiatives to squeeze savings, ef-
ficiencies, and productivity out of the acquisition regime. The new lead-
ership—primarily former CIA director, now Secretary of Defense, Leon 
Panetta—will not drive change as much as the realities and constraints of 
the federal budget. Developments In Brief: Senate Confirms Deputy Defense 
Secretary, 53 GC ¶ 320(d) (Dr. Carter confirmed as the Deputy Defense 
Secretary); Defense Secretary Warns against Broad Cuts, 53 GC ¶ 216(c) 
(outgoing [SecDef] Robert Gates [stated] that “we must not repeat the 
mistakes of the past, where budget targets were met mostly by taking a 
percentage off the top of everything.”). Nonetheless, the volume and pace 
of activity have been high, and the scope and breadth of the initiatives 
are broad. Defense Secretary Says DOD Must Remain Agile Despite Bud-
get Cuts, 53 GC ¶ 338 (Secretary Panetta warned: “If the congressional 
deficit-reduction ‘super committee’ fails to agree on budget cuts, so-called 
sequestration ‘would force defense cuts that would do catastrophic damage 
to our military and its ability to protect the country[.]’”); In ‘New Era’ DOD 
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Will Work With Industry To Get ‘More Without More’, 53 GC ¶ 52 (“Carter 
unveiled seven guideposts DOD will follow in considering its new indus-
trial structure.”). We expect dramatic pronouncements about the future 
of Defense spending early in 2012 (and throughout the campaign season).
A. Defense industrial Base and Business Board. 
If DoD procurement spending stagnates or, as is more likely, decreases, 
attention will continue to turn to the DoD industrial base. On November 
18, the House Defense Industrial Base Panel ranged far and wide in its 
hearings, as shown by the statements from The Honorable Jacques S. 
Gansler, Professor and Roger C. Lipitz Chair, University of Maryland and 
David Berteau, CSIS, available at http://csis.org/files/111118_tsBerteau.
pdf; see also, http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/2011/11/creating-
a-21st-century-defense-industry. There are no easy solutions to the chal-
lenges facing the defense industry, but a number of key steps can be taken 
to sustain and retain a healthy industry.
• We need a clearer articulation of our future national security 
strategy, one that can permit better prioritization of budget 
and force structure needs and guide reductions. 
• We need a change in incentives, both in DoD and in industry. 
• The government needs to have a better idea of which elements 
of the industrial base are most vulnerable and a better way of 
including that information in budget decisions.
• As technology development continues to occur outside the U.S., 
we need an export control regime that recognizes the global 
origin of innovation. 
What remains unclear at year end is whether the panel’s life will be ex-
tended and whether it will develop legislation for the coming year. House 
Defense Industrial Base Panel Holds Initial Hearing, 53 GC ¶ 359 (“Rep. 
Rick Larsen (D-Wash.), panel ranking member, said ‘DOD must continue 
... building a strategic, dynamic contracting process’ to ensure that ‘those 
who have great products do not fall by the wayside,’ and one way to do 
so is to grow the defense industrial base.”) Barry Watts, senior fellow at 
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) explained 
that “the prospects for the continued success of for-profit defense firms in 
providing ... superior weaponry and equipment—especially at affordable 
costs—may be at risk” unless both the defense industrial base and the 
Government’s business practices “undergo fundamental restructuring.” 
CSIS’s Pierre Chao cautioned against a “one-size-fits-all mentality” when 
promulgating a defense industrial policy. Instead, he suggested viewing 
the industry as three constituent parts: (a) emerging technologies and 
companies, including those involving mobile applications, cyberspace, 
and directed energy; (b) core market, including major defense contrac-
tors like Boeing and Lockheed; and (c) legacy businesses, which include 
ship, aircraft and tank builders and space launch operations. See also, 
Developments in Brief: HASC Establishes Bipartisan Defense Business 
Panel, 53 GC ¶ 302(b) (The Panel, led by Reps. Bill Shuster (R-Penn.) and 
Rick Larsen (D-Wash.), “is tasked with examining the current defense 
business environment and identifying contracting and regulatory issues 
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facing the defense industry. It will also look at the use of incentives 
and mandates to meet established goals, structural challenges facing 
various sectors within the industrial base, impact of the current fiscal 
environment on industry, opportunities to reduce barriers to entry, and 
how [DoD] can encourage expansion of the industrial base and foster 
the transition of technology.”)
B. The Tanker Procurement: An interim Conclusion to a 
never-ending Major System Acquisition Case Study. 
The Obama administration inherited one of the hottest potatoes 
imaginable—the future of in-flight refueling for the Air Force. This 
incredibly important, high-profile procurement attracted (and, frankly, 
merited) extraordinary attention. In 2011, the Air Force finally awarded 
a contract that did not result in a successful protest. And The Award For 
Best-Value Tanker Goes To ..., 53 GC ¶ 71 (“The Air Force … awarded the 
KC-X contract to the Boeing Co., in the Department of Defense’s third 
attempt to begin replacing the aging fleet of Eisenhower-era KC-135 
aerial refueling tankers. Boeing’s aircraft is designated the KC-46A. The 
fixed-price incentive-firm contract for engineering and manufacturing 
development is worth over $3.5 billion, and calls for 18 aircraft by 2017. 
The overall program is valued at $30 billion plus options.”) What ini-
tially appeared to be one of the most dramatic inadvertent disclosures of 
proprietary information of the modern era, while embarrassing, proved 
neither significant nor fatal. SASC Probes KC-X Data Leak, 53 GC ¶ 37 
(In December 2010, “DOD sent the Boeing Co. and European Aeronautic 
Defence and Space Co. (EADS) a limited amount of identical information 
about each other’s offer following a November 2010 accidental disclo-
sure to EADS.” The disclosure “was accidental and did not violate the 
Procurement Integrity Act.”)
By the summer, however, “Boeing … projected … [that it would] exceed 
its cost ceiling by as much as $300 million—about 6 percent—on the initial 
contract to develop and build Air Force aerial-refueling tankers, accord-
ing to government officials.” Tony Capaccio, Boeing projected to face $300 
million overrun on tanker contract, seattLe tImes at http://seattletimes.
nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2015420023_tanker25.html. Then 
USD(AT&L) Ash Carter promptly explained: “It’s not our problem because 
it’s a fixed contract and it was written with protections for the taxpayer[.]” 
Colin Clark, Boeing’s $300M Tanker Overrun Not Pentagon’s Problem: 
Ash Carter, available at http://defense.aol.com/2011/07/15/boeings-300m-
tanker-overrun-not-pentagons-problem-ash-carter/. Time will tell whether 
(1) it is, in fact, DoD’s problem or not and (2) whether a slavish resurgence 
in fixed-price contracting coupled with strict enforcement best serves the 
government’s long-term interests.
C. Boeing and Airbus: Another Arena. 
On a tangentially related note, the ongoing US-EU trade battle involv-
ing state support for large-scale aircraft development continues to play 
out before the World Trade Organization (WTO). Developments In Brief: 
WTO Panel Rules Boeing Subsidies Illegal, GC ¶ 321(b) (In a parallel 
dispute targeting subsidies to Airbus, a WTO panel ruled in June that 
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EU member states’ subsidies to Airbus violated WTO law. See also 52 GC 
¶ 228.); Boeing Subsidies Violate WTO Law, Panel Holds, 53 GC ¶ 122 
(WTO “dispute-settlement panel … held that certain U.S. federal taxation 
schemes, [DoD] and NASA research and development (R&D) funding, and 
state tax and non-tax incentives to the Boeing Co. were illegal subsidies 
under WTO law”).
D. And, Yes, the A-12. 
 Last year, we mentioned that the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in the A-12 litigation (originally filed in the COFC in June of 1991), Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. & General Dynamics Corp. v. United States. The 
U.S Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit described this litigation as 
the American version of Jarndyce and Jarndyce, the fictional court case 
in the Charles Dickens novel BLeak House. (“This scarecrow of a suit 
has, in course of time, become so complicated that no man alive knows 
what it means.”) The oral argument in this case was not the Court’s 
finest hour. Developments In Brief: Supreme Court Hears Arguments on 
State Secrets Privilege in A-12 Case, 53 GC ¶ 29(a). Now, following the 
Supreme Court’s decision, the case is headed back to the trial court. 
State Secrets Privilege Bars Litigation Of Superior Knowledge Theory 
In A-12 Case, 53 GC ¶ 177 (“The U.S. Supreme Court … held that the 
state secrets defense precludes a civil action if full litigation would lead 
to the disclosure of state secrets. …[I]n such a situation, the dispute is 
nonjusticiable, and the appropriate judicial action is to leave the parties 
‘where we found them on the day they filed suit,’ causing both parties to 
be without a judicial remedy. For now, the decision is a partial victory 
for both sides.”). 
Vii. ACQUiSiTion WoRkFoRCe 
We applauded both the message and the delivery of that message 
by outgoing OFPP Administrator Gordon. Gordon to Leave OFPP, 53 
GC ¶ 369(d). And we were pleased that the acquisition workforce was 
increasingly, and seriously, addressed—both as a matter of policy and 
legislation. Alas, we fear that much work is required, and budgetary 
pressure likely will swing the pendulum in the opposite direction. Bills 
Seek To Improve Acquisition Workforce Training, 53 GC ¶ 133; Industry 
Group Makes Legislative Recommendations, 53 GC ¶ 99 (The Acquisi-
tion Reform Working Group (ARWG) “support[s] the efforts to rebuild 
the acquisition workforce. Many of the problems with defense and 
other agency acquisitions today are the result of severe strains on the 
acquisition workforce ‘rather than a lack of appropriate rules and regu-
lations[.]’”) For example, GAO found that DCMA “faces an uphill climb 
as it tries to rebuild its workforce after undergoing significant shifts in 
its workforce, structure, and policies and procedures over the past 10 
years[.]” DCMA Faces Challenges Rebuilding Workforce, GAO Finds, 53 
GC ¶ 374. Despite recent progress: “DCMA remains ‘in a state of transi-
tion, recovering from years of workforce downsizing that raised serious 
concerns about its ability to effectively meet its missions.’ Uncertainty 
also remains about ‘whether funding will be available to retain person-
nel hired using the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund,’ 
a source of funding for an increasing number of new DCMA employees.”
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Unfortunately, focus on the officially designated acquisition workforce 
is not enough. DOD Should Better Track, Train Non-DAWIA Acquisition 
Personnel, GAO Says, 53 GC ¶ 318 (GAO reviewed 29 DoD services acqui-
sitions and found that fewer than half of the 430 personnel involved were 
covered by the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), 
which standardized education, experience and training requirements for 
the DOD acquisition workforce. “GAO found that non-DAWIA personnel 
perform functions at all stages of the services acquisition life-cycle … as 
program managers, [CORs], requirement officials, auditors, legal advisors, 
technical experts and financial managers.”).
Viii. TiLTinG AT WinDMiLLS: ConTRACToR FATALiTieS 
AnD PUBLiC PeRCePTion, ReDUX 
By the end of 2011, more than 2,700 contractors had died in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Kuwait. We continue to be frustrated that these extraor-
dinarily high contractor fatalities (and injuries) remained almost entirely 
outside the public’s consciousness. Among other things, we believe that, 
in a representative democracy, public awareness of the human cost of our 
nation’s security and foreign policies is critical. A significant body of re-
search suggests that the public is at least somewhat sensitive to military 
casualties, and we continue to wonder what impacts, if any, derive from 
a significant substitution of contractor deaths for military fatalities. See, 
generally, Steven L. Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Dead Contractors: The 
Un-Examined Effect of Surrogates on the Public’s Casualty Sensitivity, 5 
J. of nat’L seC. L. & PoL’Y ___ (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1826242. 
The Labor Department continues to earn kudos for transparency for 
posting on the Internet the data it generates based upon claims filed 
under the Defense Base Act and the War Hazards Compensation Act, 
which make contractor employees eligible for worker’s compensation 
benefits pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation 
Act. See generally www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/lsdbareports.htm. We also 
heartily applaud the Congressionally-mandated Commission on Wartime 
Contracting (CWC) for breaking new ground, bucking the trend of both 
Republican and Democratic administrations, and acknowledging that 
contractor sacrifice merits the public’s attention.
The extensive use of contractors obscures the full human cost 
of war. The full cost includes all casualties, and to neglect 
contractor deaths hides the political risks of conducting overseas 
contingency operations. In particular, significant contractor 
deaths and injuries have largely remained uncounted and 
unpublicized by the U.S. government and the media….
The recent withdrawal of combat units from Iraq and the 
surge in Afghanistan have resulted in increased contractor 
casualties. Between June 2009 and March 2011, contractor 
deaths, including local- and third-country nationals, exceeded 
the military’s in both countries. Moreover, contractor deaths 
are undoubtedly higher than the reported total because federal 
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statistics are based on filed insurance claims, and many foreign 
contractors’ employees may be unaware of their insurance rights 
and therefore unlikely to file for compensation.
Commission on Wartime Contracting, Final Report to Congress: Trans-
forming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks at 30-31 
(August 2011) (footnotes and citations omitted), available at http://www.
wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf. See also, Da-
vid Isenberg, Contratistas Desaparecidos, HuffInGton Post (October 10, 
2011) (“While … I have frequently been critical of [private military secu-
rity] use as a policy I am absolutely disgusted by the way their ultimate 
sacrifice has been airbrushed out of the official record.”).
10-16
